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A B S T R A C T
There is a growing interest on how mental imagery may be involved in the onset and maintenance of anxiety-
related disorders. Here, we used an experimental design to investigate whether a key symptom across anxiety-
related disorders, namely avoidance, can be induced via mental imagery. Healthy participants first learned that
one neutral stimulus (A) was associated with a mild electric shock and two other neutral stimuli (B and C) were
not. They then learned to cancel the shock when A was presented, by pressing a button on a keyboard (‘be-
havioral avoidance’). Next, they were asked to imagine that stimulus B was followed by the shock (i.e., without
actual B or shock presentations; Experiment 1; N = 66) or they were shown B and asked to imagine the shock
(i.e., without actual shock presentations; Experiment 2; N = 60). Finally, in the test phase, they were shown
each of the three stimuli (without the shock) and given the opportunity to make the avoidance response. Results
showed that participants tended to avoid B in the test phase in Experiment 1, even though it had never been
presented with the shock but not in Experiment 2. We discuss how the findings may explain the acquisition of
avoidance in the presentation of innocuousstimuli across anxiety-related disorders.
1. Induction of conditioned avoidance via mental imagery
There is a growing interest on the role of mental imagery in anxiety-
and stress-related disorders and how it can be involved in the etiology,
maintenance, and treatment of mental disorders (e.g., Engelhard,
McNally, & van Schie, 2019; Hirsch & Holmes, 2007; Holmes &
Mathews, 2010; Patel et al., 2007). To illustrate, Morina, Deeprose,
Pusowski, Schmid, and Holmes, (2011) showed that patients with an-
xiety disorders are more able to generate imagery for prospective ne-
gative scenarios compared to patients with major depression or healthy
controls. Despite these insights, we lack important knowledge about the
basic learning mechanisms of how mental imagery could probably lead
to specific symptoms of anxiety-related disorders.
In order to shed light on the basic learning mechanisms of the onset
of anxiety-related disorders, conditioning procedures are often em-
ployed. In such procedures, a neutral stimulus (e.g., picture of a square;
conditioned stimulus or CS) is associated with an aversive stimulus
(e.g., an electric shock; Unconditioned stimulus or US) so that now the
CS will evoke fear reactions (e.g., increased fear; conditioned responses
or CRs) to the CS alone. Although conditioning protocols typically in-
volve the direct experience of CS and the US, there is evidence that the
acquisition, extinction, and maintenance of CRs can also be achieved
via imagining the CR, the US, and their associations (for reviews see
Dadds, Bovbjerg, Redd, & Cutmore, 1997; Mertens, Krypotos, &
Engelhard, 2020). To illustrate, Jones and Davey (1990) have shown
that after undergoing a differential conditioning procedure, in which
one CS (i.e., CS+) was paired with a shock whereas another CS (i.e.,
CS-) was not, participants who were asked to mentally rehearse the
shock after the end of the procedure, retained higher CRs (i.e., elevated
skin conductance) compared to participants who mentally rehearsed a
neutral event (i.e., a cat meowing). These results suggest that US ima-
gery preserves CRs. In another fear conditioning study, Dibbets, Poort,
and Arntz (2012) showed that adding an imagery rescripting procedure,
in which participants devalued the US after fear acquisition, reduced
return of fear induced by a different context, compared to a control
procedure of mere positive imagery. More recently, Mueller, Sperl, and
Panitz (2020) showed that fear responses (e.g., startle reactions) to
neutral faces (i.e., CSs) were evoked by just combining these CSs with
neutral objects that were previously paired with aversive mental
images. Collectively, experimental findings demonstrate that con-
ditioning procedures can be useful to test whether mental imagery is
involved in the onset and maintenance of learned fear.
Despite these insights, most studies including mental imagery in
conditioning procedures have used only subjective and physiological
CRs (Mertens et al., 2020). To our knowledge, no study so far has at-
tempted to test whether mental imagery may also result in another key
symptom of anxiety-related and stress-related disorders; namely beha-
vioral avoidance (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
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Experimental evidence suggests that behavioral avoidance maintains
anxiety (e.g., Lovibond, Mitchell, Minard, Brady, & Menzies, 2009) and
may trigger a return of fear after extinction took place (van Uijen, Leer,
& Engelhard, 2018; Vervliet & Indekeu, 2015). This is why a thick body
of literature has focused on finding the factors involved in the onset of
avoidance. Previous laboratory research has shown that conditioned
avoidance can not only be acquired via direct experience, but also by
verbal instructions (Mertens, Boddez, Sevenster, Engelhard, & De
Houwer, 2018), or vicarious learning (Lindström & Olsson, 2015). Im-
portantly, if avoidance can only be induced via these pathways, it re-
mains unclear why patients with anxiety symptomatology avoid in-
nocuous stimuli, without recalling any direct or indirect (i.e., via verbal
instruction or social observation) associations between these stimuli
and an aversive (i.e., now the phobic) event (Rachman, 1977). This
could be explained by considering that mental imagery may also result
in behavioral avoidance.
As such, the goal of the present research was to examine whether
avoidance towards CSs can be established by mental imagery. We
conducted two experiments. The aim of experiment 1 was to test
whether avoidance towards a stimulus that was never paired with an
aversive event can be established by asking participants to imagine that
stimulus, the aversive event, and their association. First, participants
completed a differential Pavlovian fear procedure, in which one neutral
CS (A+) was followed by a mild electric shock, whereas two other
neutral stimuli (B- and C-) were not followed by a shock. Then, and in
line with previous studies (Krypotos, Vervliet, & Engelhard, 2018), they
completed an instrumental procedure, in which A+ and C- were pre-
sented. Participants could avoid the shock presentation by pressing the
space bar on a computer keyboard. Next, they completed an imagery
phase, and were assigned to one of two groups. A Negative imagery
group was asked to imagine that stimulus B was followed by the shock
and their responses to it (i.e., without actual B or shock presentations,
whereas a Neutral imagery group was asked to imagine that B- was
followed by a neutral tone. Finally, in the test phase, each CS was
shown and participants were given the opportunity to make an avoid-
ance response (i.e., space-bar press). They were also asked to rate their
shock expectancy and fear.
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test whether avoidance can be
established when participants rehearsed the shock, in the presence of
the CS (i.e., during CS presentation). Such a procedure is similar to
previous imagery studies (e.g., Jones & Davey, 1990) and is simpler
compared to the procedure of Experiment 1. As such, in Experiment 2
the Negative imagery group was asked to imagine a shock (and their
reactions to it) whenever B- was presented, whereas the Neutral ima-
gery group was asked to imagine a neutral tone (and their reactions to
it) whenever B- was presented. In each experiment, we expected more
avoidance responses to B- for the Negative imagery group compared to




A power analysis with G*Power, showed that for an effect size of
f = 0.20 (medium to small), for 3 measurements (the 3 CSs) and 2
groups, an alpha level of 0.05, a power of .80, a correlation between
repeated measures of 0.5, a non-sphericity correction ε of 1, and the
G*Power 3.0 as the effect size specification, we needed at least 42
participants. In order to account for potential missing data, we re-
cruited 66 individuals, which allowed us to detect an effect size of
f = 0.18.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Sixty-six individuals participated in Experiment 1 (49 females; 17
males; mean age = 22.27 years, SD = 3.63). The data of one additional
participant were removed from the analyses due to him/her stopping
before the end of the experiment. Participants were assigned on order of
appearance to the Negative imagery (n = 34) or the Neutral imagery
(n = 32) group. Each participant was interviewed prior to their parti-
cipation to evaluate exclusion criteria (i.e., any psychiatric disorder,
colorblindness, hearing problems, pregnancy, and medication that
could affect their attention, reactions, or memory, all assessed by self-
report).
CSs were three coloured squares (i.e., green, orange, or blue) of
100 × 100 pixels. Which CS served as A+ and C- was determined
randomly, but the blue square always served as B-. The US was an
electric shock delivered via a Coulbourn Transcutaneous Aversive
Finger Stimulator (E13-22) with a 9-V dry cell battery attached to an
adjustable step-up transformer. The shock level was set individually to a
level that is definitely unpleasant but not painful (Fonteyne, Vervliet,
Hermans, Baeyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2009).
2.1.3. Measures
US-expectancy ratings were collected during all CS presentations in
all conditioning phases using a 10-point scale ranging from −5 (cer-
tainly no electric stimulus), to 0 (uncertain), to 5 (certainly an electric
stimulus). CS-fear was measured using a 10-point scale ranging from −5
(not fearful at all) to 5 (extremely fearful). Participants also rated US-
unpleasantness from −5 (too unpleasant), to (neutral), to 5 (pleasant),
US-intensity (weak, moderate, intense, enormous, unbearable), and US-
startlingness (not, light, moderate, strong, too strong). They reported their
motivation to complete the computer task and to fill in the ques-
tionnaire on two scales ranging from −5 (very low) to 5 (very high).
Finally, they completed the neuroticism portion of the Eysenck
Personality Questionnaire (EPQ-N) (H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; see
Lommen, Engelhard, and van den Hout (2010) for a study showing that
avoidance generalization is modulated by levels of neuroticism) and the
Betts’ Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (QMI) (Sheehan, 1967).
Table 1
Overview of the experimental design used in Experiment 1 for both groups. The numbers within the brackets denote the number of trials for each stimulus.
Pavlovian Phase Instrumental Phase Imagery Phase Test Phase
Negative Imagery A+ (3) A*+/− (5) Imagine B is followed by a US A*-? (4)
B-(3) A+(1) B*-? (4)
C-(3) C*-(5) C*-? (4)
C-(1)
Neutral Imagery A+ (3) A*+/− (5) Imagine B is followed by a tone A*-? (4)
B-(3) A+(1) B*-? (4)
C-(3) C*-(5) C*-? (4)
C-(1)
Note. +: US presentation; -: US absence; +/−: US presentation is conditional to whether participants pressed the button or not. *: Avoidance response availability.
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2.1.4. Procedure
A schematic overview of the procedure is shown on Table 1. The
basic conditioning design used by Lovibond et al. (2009) and
Engelhard, van Uijen, van Seters, and Velu (2015) was modified to the
purpose of this study, for instance, by including an imagery phase.
First, participants read the information brochure and signed the
consent form. Then the shock electrodes were fitted on participants’
middle of the index and middle finger of their non-dominant hands.
Participants were instructed, both verbally and on-screen, that they
would encounter different stimuli, some of which would be followed by
a shock. They were also instructed that they should provide their US-
expectancy by using the US-expectancy scale that would be presented
on the bottom of the screen. Then, the Pavlovian phase started.
Each conditioning trial started with the presentation of one of the
three CSs for 5 s. Then, the US-expectancy scale was presented on the
bottom of the screen for 5 s. The Pavlovian Phase consisted of three
presentations of A+, B-, and C-. In case of A+, the shock was presented
immediately after the end of the trial. In order to keep the experiment
short, and given that no physiological measures were included, the
inter-trial intervals were short (2, 3, or 4 s) and were presented ran-
domly. The order of all trials, throughout the task, was pseudorandom
with no more than 2 presentations of the same type of trial.
Before the beginning of the Instrumental phase, participants were
informed that they could avoid the shock by pressing the space bar
during the first 5 s of the CS presentation. Instructions stressed that they
had to press the button only if they expected a shock and not during the
presentation of every CS. The trial structure was the same as in the
Pavlovian phase. Performing the avoidance response before rating the
US-expectancy is in line with previous avoidance studies (e.g.,
Lovibond et al., 2009). Then the Instrumental phase started, in which
participants encountered 5 presentations of stimulus A or C while the
avoidance response was available. Importantly, to ensure that partici-
pants understood that A was still followed by the US and C was not, we
also presented both A and C once without the availability of the
avoidance response. This is in line with previous studies (Engelhard
et al., 2015; Lovibond et al., 2009).
Following the instrumental phase, participants were randomly as-
signed to the Negative imagery or the Neutral imagery group. The Negative
imagery group listened to the following text though headphones
(translated from Dutch):
“Imagine this situation as if it is happening now. Imagine that you see
different squares on the screen. At some point, you see the blue square.
You rate how much you expect the electric stimulation. At the end of the
presentation of the blue square, you feel the shock on your hand. You are
frightened, your heart rate increases, and your hands begin to sweat.
Keep the image of this situation as vividly as possible in your imagination.
Concentrate on the sensations you feel. Can you see the square? Do you
feel the shock? Take your time to imagine it. Press the space bar when
you have imagined the situation as vividly and detailed as possible.”
The script for the Neutral imagery group was (also translated from
Dutch):
“Imagine this situation as if it is happening now. Imagine that you
see different squares on the screen. At some point, you see the blue
square. You rate how much you expect the electric stimulation. At
the end of the presentation of the blue square, you hear a neutral
tone. You feel calm and not scared at all, and you continue to
breathe normally. Imagine this situation as vividly as possibly.
Concentrate on the sensations that you feel. Do you hear the tone?
Take your time to imagine the situation. Press the space bar when
you have imagined the situation as vividly and detailed as possible.”
Then the experiment continued with the Test phase, in which par-
ticipants saw four unreinforced presentations of A, B, and C. They were
told that the experiment would continue and they would see the pic-
tures of squares. After the experimental task, participants were asked to
rate their fear about the CS (i.e., the fear ratings), filled out the EPQ and
QMI, and rated their US evaluation.
2.1.5. Statistical analyses
All questionnaires, the US-ratings, the CS ratings (i.e., fear ratings
and US-expectancies), and background characteristics were analysed
using separate independent samples t-tests, except for sex, which was
analysed using a chi-square test. US-expectancy characteristics were
analysed separately for each phase using 3 (CS: A, B, C) x 2 (Group:
Negative imagery vs. Neutral imagery) xTrial repeated measures Analyses
of Variance (ANOVAs), with 2 within subject factors (CS, Trial) and 1
between subject factor (Group). The levels of the Trial factor were
adjusted according to the number of trials of each phase (see Table 1).
In case the sphericity was violated, we used the Greenhouse-Geisser
Corrections. In case of significant interactions, we followed-up the re-
sults with post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction. In case of multiple
comparisons, we used the Holm's post-hoc tests within JASP, with the
corresponding p-values denoted as pHolm.
Before analysing the avoidance data, mean proportions of each
stimulus were computed separately for the Instrumental and the Test
phase. Then, we ran separate 3 (CS: A, B, C) x 2 (Group: Negative
imagery vs. Neutral imagery) repeated measures ANOVAs.
As in previous studies (e.g., Krypotos & Engelhard, 2018), we con-
ducted our analyses within both a Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing
and a Bayesian framework. For the Bayesian analyses, we computed
Bayes factors, the Bayesian alternative to a Null-Hypothesis Sig-
nificance Testing. Bayes factors quantify the amount of evidence that
the data provide for one of two hypotheses, which are the alternative
and the null hypotheses in this study. The larger the Bayes factor, the
more relative evidence there is for one hypothesis compared to the
other. Here, we denote Bayes factors that quantify evidence under the
experimental hypothesis, relative to the null hypothesis, with BF10, and
the reverse with BF01 (see Krypotos, Blanken, Arnaudova, Matzke, &
Beckers, (2017) for a basic introduction of Bayesian statistics for psy-
chopathology research). In case of the Bayesian post-hoc tests, the letter
“U” next to the Bayes factor indicates that they are uncorrected as
mentioned within JASP.
It is recommended that researchers reporting Bayesian results refer
to their statistical models and selection of prior distributions (i.e., dis-
tributions that quantify the researcher's current knowledge before
seeing the data) (Krypotos, Klugkist, Mertens, & Engelhard, 2019). For
the Bayesian analyses, we used the validated models described in
Rouder and Morey (2012) and Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and
Iverson (2009). All models were run using JASP (Love et al., 2015). For
the alternative hypotheses, we used a Cauchy distribution with mean at
zero and a scale factor of 0.707 (default option) and 1. The direction of
the results remain the same when the different scale factors were used,
so we present the results using the former scale factor. For the Bayesian
post-hoc tests, we use the default post-hoc models in JASP. We do not
report Bayes factors for post-hoc tests when there is an interaction, this
a matter of further development in the field (Wagenmakers et al.,
2018). For the Bayesian χ2 tests, we used the default models in JASP. In
the spirit of open-science (Krypotos et al., 2019), all data and materials
are available at: https://osf.io/mbr87/.
3. Results
3.1. Demographics and self-reports
No between group differences were detected in terms of age, t
(61.14) = −0.085, p = 0.932, Cohen's d = - 0.021, BF01 = 3.952 or
sex, χ2 (1) = 0.891, BF01 independent multinomial = 2.946.
No between-group differences were found regarding the QMI scores,
t(63.79) = −1.246, p = 0.217, Cohen's d = −0.307, BF01 = 2.055,
EPQ-N, t (62.54) = −0.494, p = 0.62, BF01 = 3.577, US- un-
pleasantness, t(53.57) = 0.495, p = 0.623, Cohen's d = 0.121,
A.-M. Krypotos, et al. Behaviour Research and Therapy 132 (2020) 103652
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BF01 = 3.582, US-intensity, t(63.31) = 1.821, p = 0.073, Cohen's
d = 0.449, BF01 = 0.980, or US-startlingness, t(63.90) = 1.188,
p= 0.239, Cohen's d = 0.293, BF01 = 2.181. Finally, no between group
differences were detected for the motivation to complete the task, t
(62.07) = 0.11, p = 0.913, Cohen's d = 0.027, BF01 = 3.944, or to fill
out the questionnaires, t(62.35) = −0.154, p = 0.878, Cohen's
d = −0.038, BF01 = 3.924. For detailed scores across groups, please
see the Supplementary materials.
3.2. US-expectancies
Mean US-expectancies across all phases are shown in Fig. 1. Across
the Pavlovian phase, participants reported different US-expectancies for
the CSs, CS x Trial F(2.50, 159.68) = 87.786, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.587,
BF10 = 6.726 × 1043, which was similar across groups, CS x Trial x
Group, F(2.50, 159.68) = 0.238, p = 0.835, η2p = 0.004,
BF01 = 41.666. Post-hoc analyses showed that participants reported
higher US-expectancies for A than B, pHolm<0.001,
BF10U = 1.193 × 1023 and A than C, pHolm<0.001, BF10
U = 3.946 × 1027. These results indicate successful acquisition.
In the instrumental phase, participants also reported higher US-ex-
pectancies for A compared to C, CS F(1, 64.) = 46.044, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.418, BF10 = 5.596 × 1013, which did not differ as a function of
trial, CS x Trial, F(2.61, 167.14), p = 0.183, BF01 = 61.815, or group,
CS x Group, F(2.61, 167.14) = 0.620, p = 0.581, η2p = 0.010,
BF01 = 276220.492.
As predicted, between group differences were reported in the Test
phase, CS x Group, F(1.35, 86.69) = 4.834, p = 0.021, η2p = 0.070,
BF10 = 9.122 × 106. Although there was a significant interaction with
Group, CS x Trial x Group, F(3.73, 238.80) = 2.69, p = 0.035,
η2p = 0.040, the relevant Bayes factor provided strong support from the
null hypothesis compared to the alternative one BF01 = 45.456. Testing
US-expectancies for stimulus B in the Test phase showed that there were
between group differences, pHolm<0.001, BF10 = 553.972, with
participants in the Negative imagery group reporting higher US-ex-
pectancies, Mean = −1.792, compared to the Neutral imagery group,
Mean = −4.00. Post-hoc tests showed that no-between group differ-
ences arose in the test phase for stimulus A, pHolm = 1, or C,
pHolm = 1, but only for B, pHolm = 0.005. Collectively, the results
indicate that negative imagery, compared to neutral imagery, resulted
in elevated US-expectancies to stimulus B.
3.3. Avoidance
Fig. 2, top and middle panel, shows mean proportions of avoidance
reactions for the instrumental (left) and the test phase (right).
Results showed that during the instrumental phase, participants
learnt to press the space bar more often during the presentation of the A
compared to C, CS F(1, 64) = 683.690, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.914,
BF10 = 2.045 × 1051, in both groups, CS x Group, F(1, 64) = 0.96,
p = 0.33, η2p = 0.015, BF01 = 2.611.
Between group differences were detected in the test phase, CS x
Group, F(1.66, 105.98) = 11.613, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.154,
BF10 = 2353.584. Follow up t-tests, as well as the respective post-hoc
tests, for B and C showed that although the Negative imagery group
pressed the space bar more often during the presentation of the B than
C, t(33.71) = −3.741, p < 0.001, Cohen's d = −0.642,
BF10 = 44.062, pHolm < 0.001, this was not the case for the Neutral
Imagery group, t(31) = −1.00, p = 0.325, Cohen's d = −0.177,
BF01 = 3.347, pHolm = 1. Collectively, the results indicate that ne-
gative imagery, relative to neutral imagery, resulted in more condi-
tioned avoidance.
3.4. Fear ratings
Regarding the CS-fear ratings, between group differences were de-
tected, CS x Group, F(1.67, 106.62) = 6.90, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.097,
BF10 = 44.316. Post-hoc tests showed that in accordance with the
avoidance responses and the US-expectancies, participants in the
Negative imagery group reported more fear for B than for C,
pHolm<0.001, than those of the Neutral imagery group,
pHolm = 0.493. Collectively, the Negative imagery group reported
higher fear ratings for B, compared to C, than the Neutral imagery group.
3.5. Discussion
In this first experiment, we tested whether conditioned avoidance
and subjective CRs (US-expectancies and fear ratings) can be acquired
via the imagery of CS-US associations. Confirming our hypotheses, re-
sults showed that participants in the Negative imagery group, who
imagined the association between a safe CS (i.e, B) and a US, exhibited
higher avoidance rates and subjective fear towards the control stimulus
(i.e., the C), than the control group (i.e., Neutral imagery group).
In Experiment 2, we attempted to replicate and extend the findings
of Experiment 1. Specifically, in Experiment 1, we attempted to test
whether mental imagery of the CS, the US, and their associations are
sufficient for the installation of conditioned avoidance. In Experiment
2, we attempted to test whether simple mental rehearsal of the US is
sufficient for establishing avoidance. Such a procedure was sufficient
for maintaining conditioned responses in prior research (e.g., see Jones
& Davey, 1990), but it still remains unknown whether similar findings
arise for avoidance responses. As such, in Experiment 2, we instructed
participants to imagine the US and their reactions to it (or a neutral
tone in the control condition), whenever B- was actually presented,
without giving them explicit instructions about the CS-US con-
tingencies. By testing this question, we could clarify whether imagery of
the CS, US, and CS-US contingency is required for the induction of
explicit avoidance or whether just US rehearsal, in the presence of the
CS, as in Jones and Davey (1990), is sufficient to install avoidance.
Fig. 1. Experiment 1: Mean US-expectancy ratings across the whole experiment
for all CSs for the Negative Imagery Group (top panel) and the Neutral Imagery
Group (bottom panel).





There were 62 participants, but two of them discontinued the ex-
periment, so their data were removed from further analyses. The re-
maining 60 participants (37 females, 23 males; mean age = 22.52
years, SD = 2.40) were randomly assigned to one of two groups:
Negative imagery (N = 30) or Neutral imagery (N = 30). All participants
were screened using the same criteria as in Experiment 1.
4.1.2. Materials
The same stimuli and questionnaires were used as in the first ex-
periment, but we added the Vividness scale, on which participants rated
the vividness of each mental image (see below) using a scale from 1 (not
at all) to 9 (as vividly as a real image), and the trait (STAI-T) and state
(STAI-S) scales of the Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (Ploeg,
2000; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). The STAI-S was com-
pleted both at the beginning and the end of the main experiment.
The procedure (see Table 2), including trial sequence and timing,
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Mean proportion of avoidance responses for each CS and for each group during the instrumental (top) and test phase (middle panel). Fear
ratings for each CS and for each group (bottom panel).
Table 2
Schematic overview of the experimental design used in Experiment 2 for both










A+ (6) A*+/− (6) Imagine the US
when you see B
A*-? (4)
B-(6) A+(2) B*-? (4)
C-(6) C*-(6) C*-? (4)
C-(2)
Neutral Imagery A+ (6) A*+/− (6) Imagine a tone
when you see B
A*-? (4)
B-(6) A+(2) B- (8) B*-? (4)
C-(6) C*-(6) C*-? (4)
C-(2)
Note.+: US presentation; -: US absence; +/−: US presentation is conditional to
whether participants pressed the button or not. *: Avoidance response avail-
ability.
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was identical to the procedure of Experiment 1, except for the following
changes: (1) we collected CS-fear ratings at the beginning and the end
of the experiment, (2) we slightly increased the number of trials to get
stronger conditioning effects, and (3) scripts for the imagery phase were
adjusted to the purpose of Experiment 2.
For the Negative imagery group, the script mentioned the following
(translated from Dutch):
“Whenever you see a blue square in the next phase, imagine a shock and
your reactions to it, like the shock you received in the first phase of the
experiment. For example, imagine that you receive a shock on your
fingers. As a result of it your heart rate increases, and your hands begin
to sweat. So Whenever you see a blue square in the next phase, visualize
this situation and the accompanying sensations as vividly as possible.”
Accordingly, the script for Neutral imagery was the following
(translated from Dutch):
“Whenever you see the blue square in the next phase, imagine that you
hear a neutral tone. Imagine also your reactions to this tone, as vividly as
possible. For example, imagine that whenever you hear a tone that you
feel calm and not anxious, and that you breath normally. So when you
see the blue square in the next phase, visualize that you are in this si-
tuation as vividly as possible.”
The blue square was then presented for 6 times. At the end of this
phase, participants completed the vividness scale.
4.1.3. Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were identical to those of Experiment 1, except:
a) for all repeated measures ANOVAs, we changed the levels of the trial
factor (see Table 2), because more trials were used in this experiment,
and b) for the fear ratings, we used a 3 (CS: A, B, C) x 2 (Time: Be-
ginning vs. End) repeated measures ANOVA.
5. Results
5.1. Demographics and self-reports
No between group differences were detected in terms of age, t
(53.73) = 1.35, p = 0.182, Cohen's d = 0.349, BF01 = 1.776, or sex,
χ2(1) = 0.071, BF01 independent multinomial = 3.021.
As in Experiment 1, no between-group differences were found re-
garding the QMI scores, t(57.10) = 0.762, p = 0.762, Cohen's
d = −0.079, BF01 = 3.665, EPQ-N, t(57.06) = −0.488, p = −0.126,
BF01 = 3.447, US- unpleasantness, t(56.07) = 0.487, p = 0.628,
Cohen's d = −0.127, BF01 = 3.802, US-intensity, t(52.66) = −0.246,
p = 0.807, Cohen's d = −0.065, BF01 = 3.637, or US-startlingness, t
(56.47) = 0.332, p = 0.741, Cohen's d = 0.086, BF01 = 3.613. No
between group differences were also detected for the STAI-S at the
beginning, t(57.99) = 0.60, p = 0.554, Cohen's d = 0.154,
BF01 = 3.283, or end of the experiment, t(57.07) = −0.66, p = 0.512,
Cohen's d = −0.171, BF01 = 3.172, or STAI-T, t(55.48) = 1.352,
p = 0.182, BF01 = 1.775. Also, no between-group differences were
detected in terms of image vividness rating, t(57.96) = 1.29,
p= 0.204, Cohen's d = 0.332, BF01 = 1.909. Finally, no between group
differences were detected for the motivation to complete the task, t
(54.81) = 0.369, p = 0.713, p = 0.098, BF01 = 3.524, or to fill in the
questionnaires, t(55.99) = 1.179, p = 0.243, Cohen's d = 0.309,
BF01 = 2.109. For detailed scores across groups, please see the
Supplementary materials.
5.2. US-expectancies
The mean US-expectancies across all phases are shown in Fig. 3.
During the Pavlovian phase, participants reported different US-ex-
pectancies, CS x Trial, F(5.99, 347.42) = 112.295, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.659, BF10 = 10 × 101000, which was similar across groups, CS x
Trial x Group, F(5.99, 347.42) = 1.925, p = 0.076, η2p = 0.032,
BF01 = 18.221. Post-hoc tests showed different US-expectancies be-
tween A and B, pHolm<0.001, BF10U = 1.997 × 1088, and A and C,
pHolm<0.001, BF10U = 8.652 × 1084. No between-group differences
were found on the first trial between A and B, pHolm = 1, A and C,
pHolm = 1, and C and B, pHolm = 1.
In the instrumental phase, participants also reported higher US-ex-
pectancies for A compared to C, CS x Trial, F(3.09, 179.48) = 4.972,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.079, BF01 = 1.335. Again, this differentiation was
similar across groups, CS x Trial x Group, F(3.09, 179.48) = 2.528,
p = 0.057, η2p = 0.042, BF01 = 7.473.
There were differences during the Test phase, CS F(1.23,
71.16) = 14.853, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.018, BF10 = 8791.582, but not as
a function of Trial, CS x Trial, F(3.59, 208.08) = 1.77, p = 0.143,
η2p = 0.030, BF01 = 98.365, or Group, CS x Group, F(1.23,
71.16) = 1.09, p= 0.315, η2p = 0.018, BF10 = 0.390. Post-hoc analyses
for the CS main effect showed significant differences between A and B,
pHolm = 0.003, BF10U = 134608.547, A and C, pHolm<0.001,
BF10U = 1.524 × 1019, and B and C, pHolm = 0.005,
BF10U = 725.819.
Collectively, these results suggest that the negative imagery pro-
tocol did not result in different US-expectancies compared to the
Fig. 3. Experiment 3: Mean US-expectancy ratings for all CSs across the whole
experiment for the Negative Imagery Group (top panel) and the Neutral
Imagery Group (bottom panel).




Fig. 4 (top two rows) shows mean proportions of avoidance reac-
tions for the instrumental and the test phase.
Results showed that during the instrumental phase, participants
learned to press the space bar more often during the presentation of A
compared to C, CS F(1, 58) = 968.68, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.944,
BF10 = 6.760 × 1053, in both groups, CS x Group, F(1, 58) = 2.61,
p = 0.111, η2p = 0.043, BF01 = 1.201.
Between CS differences were detected in the test phase, CS, F(1.53,
88.72) = 142.188, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.710, BF10 = 2.164 × 1038, but
this pattern was not different for groups, CS x Group F(1.53,
88.72) = 0.058, p = 0.902, η2p = 0.001, BF01 = 9.376. Post-hoc ana-
lyses for the CS main effect showed significant differences between A
and B, pHolm<0.001, BF10U = 1.149 × 1015, A and C,
pHolm<0.001, BF10U = 8.522 × 1016, but no differences between B
and C, pHolm = 0.181, BF10U = 2.816. Taken together, there was no
evidence that the imagery manipulation of Experiment 2 increased
avoidance responses.
5.4. Fear ratings
Fig. 4 (bottom two rows) show the fear ratings for each group in the
beginning and at the end of the experiment. Both groups evaluated the
CSs differently, CS F(1.42, 82.15) = 56.947, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.495,
BF10 = 5.026 × 1013, and this effect differed as a function of time, CS x
Trial F(1.73, 100.27) = 90.244, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.609,
BF10 = 3.049 × 1014, but not as a function of group, F(1.42,
82.15) = 1.279, p = 0.275, η2p = 0.022, BF01 = 5.089, or trial and
group, CS x Trial x Group F(1.73, 100.27) = 2.383, p = 0.105,
η2p = 0.039, BF01 = 2.291. Post-hoc comparisons of the CS x Trial in-
teraction showed that no differences between stimuli at the beginning
of the experiment, all t < 1, p>0.90, but at the end, there were
different ratings to A compared to C, pHolm<0.001, A compared to B,
pHolm<0.001, but not to C compared to B, t = −2.537,
pHolm = 0.119.
Fig. 4. Experiment 2: Mean proportion of avoidance responses for each CS and for each group during the instrumental (top panel) and test phase (second panel). Fear
ratings for each CS and for each group (bottom two panels). Initial refers to the fear ratings before the conditioning phase and Final refers to the fear ratings after the
test phase.
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6. Discussion
We attempted to replicate the results of Experiment 1 by using a
simpler procedure in which participants were asked to imagine only the
US, and not the CS, without any explicit mention of the CS-US relationship.
Results showed that the Negative imagery group, which was asked to
imagine the US whenever B- was presented, and the Neutral imagery
group showed similar levels of avoidance and CS fear ratings to this
stimulus compared to the control stimulus (C-). The results were largely
similar for US-expectancies, with higher ratings for the Negative imagery
group compared to the Neutral imagery group. Collectively, we did not
find evidence that imagery of a US in the presence of a safe CS is suf-
ficient for the acquisition of avoidance and subjective measures of fear.
6.1. General discussion
We tested whether two imagery procedures could result in the in-
duction of conditioned avoidance and subjective measures of fear (i.e.,
US-expectancies and fear ratings). Experiment 1 showed that partici-
pants who were instructed to imagine the association between a safe
CS, a shock US, and their fear responses, showed more avoidance re-
sponses and subjective fear for that CS, compared to individuals who
were instructed to imagine associations of the same CS with a neutral
tone. Experiment 2 showed that just imagining a shock US, while seeing
a safe CS, did not lead to conditioned avoidance or higher fear for that.
Collectively, the results indicate that mental imagery could lead to
conditioned avoidance and subjective fear but only when the CS, US,
and their association are imagined.
Our previous work has shown that avoidance reflex-like tendencies
can be acquired via mere learning of CS-US associations. Specifically,
the research by Krypotos, Effting, Arnaudova, Kindt, and Beckers
(2014) showed that after undergoing a differential fear conditioning
procedure, participants were faster to avoid the CS+ and approach the
CS- than the reverse. Experiment 1 extends these findings by showing
that mere imagination of a CS-US association can also result in the
acquisition of overt avoidance.
The finding that conditioned avoidance can be acquired via mental
imagery could explain past reports of people with phobias who report
no history of conditioning via direct experience (Rachman & Silva,
1978). The common explanation for these findings is that fear can also
be acquired via instructions or observation (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).
Recent experiments indeed show that avoidance can be acquired via
these pathways (e.g., Cameron, Schlund, & Dymond, 2015; Dymond,
Schlund, Roche, De Houwer, & Freegard, 2012. Our findings extend
prior results and theories in two important ways. First, they suggest that
psychopathology and avoidance could be acquired without social in-
teractions or direct experience, although experience with an aversive/
phobic event (here the US) seems to be necessary. Second, this proce-
dure may not even need to include instructions about the avoidance
response per se (i.e., that it may cancel the US presentation) as in
previous studies (Dymond et al., 2012). It may be sufficient that the
imagery procedure only refers to CS-US associations without any re-
ference to how the US may be avoided.
In their review of imagery in conditioning research, Dadds et al.
(1997) separated different elements of conditioning procedures that
could be parts of imagery protocols, such as CS-US pairings or only the
US when the CS is presented. Along that line, we tested in Experiment 2
whether conditioned avoidance and subjective fear could also be ac-
quired, as in Experiment 1, when participants were only asked to
imagine the US whenever a CS- was presented, and without being told
the potential contingencies between the CS and US (see also Jones &
Davey, 1990). We did not find any evidence that this procedure leads to
the acquisition of avoidance or subjective fear.1 Combined with the
results of Experiment 1, these findings suggest that the acquisition of
overt avoidance via mental imagery is possible when participants ima-
gine the CS, the US (including their responses to it), and their asso-
ciation.
There are different explanations as to why Experiment 2 did not
extend the results of Experiment 1 to procedures where just US re-
hearsal, while seeing the CS, is sufficient for the establishment of
conditioned responses. First, repeatedly imagining the US in
Experiment 2 could have extinguished the conditioned responses to-
wards the B- throughout the imagery procedure. Second, combined
with the findings by Jones and Davey (1990), it could be argued that
although imagining the US in the presence of a CS can result in the
maintenance of CRs, it is not sufficient for the acquisition of CRs or
avoidance. Third, it may be easier to install fear and avoidance by
mental imagery of CS-US contingencies than by merely imaging the US.
Indeed, previous research has found that mental imagery of the US can
lead to heightened fear responses, but only for more anxious partici-
pants (Davey & Matchett, 1994). In our recent review on mental ima-
gery and conditioning, we also found that different imagery procedures
lead to different conditioning results (see Table 2 of Mertens et al., 2020
). Subsequent research in which these two types of imagery are directly
compared could shed more light on this issue. It should also be noted
that in both experiments, participants experienced the electric stimu-
lation but not the neutral tone. This could have resulted in more vivid
imagery in the Negative imagery group than the Neutral imagery group,
but it does not explain the null-findings of Experiment 2.
One alternative explanation for our findings could be fear learning
through verbal instructions (Dymond et al., 2012; Mertens et al., 2018).
However, such an explanation cannot easily accommodate the results of
Experiment 1, in which the imagery scenario referred to the CS-US
contingencies only with no reference to the avoidance response, or the
null results of Experiment 2. Furthermore, rather than an alternative
learning pathway, mental imagery could be the mediating mechanism
between instructions and their effects on avoidance and fear responses
(). Hence, these two explanations (i.e., instructions and mental ima-
gery) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Future research could
clarify the specific effects of instructions and mental imagery by com-
paring the acquisition of avoidance responses in participants who are
merely instructed about the CS-US relationship compared to partici-
pants who are asked to vividly imagine the CS-US relationship (i.e., see
Experiment 1).
The results provide pointers towards the further investigation of the
role of mental imagery on conditioned avoidance. For example, future
research could test whether an imagery protocol could result in the
reduction of conditioned avoidance responses if individuals are asked to
imagine that a CS+ is no longer followed by a US. Also, similar to the
research by Dymond et al. (2012), a comparison of different pathways
of avoidance acquisition (i.e., direct experience, instructions, observa-
tional learning, and mental imagery) could be useful for investigating
potential differences in the rate of avoidance, and maybe subjective fear
(Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, & Kalisch, 2014).
In summary, this research shows that conditioned avoidance and
subjective fear can be induced when participants are asked to imagine a
CS being followed by a US, but not when they are asked to imagine just
the US whenever the CS is presented. Our results provide a first in-
dication that mental imagery can result in conditioned avoidance, but
also call for further investigation in this area.
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